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Abstract
The concentration of personal wealth is now receiving a great deal of attention
– after having been neglected for many years. One reason is the growing
recognition that, in seeking explanations for rising income inequality, we need
to look not only at wages and earned income but also at income from capital,
particularly at the top of the distribution. In this paper, we use evidence from
existing data sources to attempt to answer three questions: (i) What is the
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share of total personal wealth that is owned by the top 1 per cent, or the top
0.1 per cent? (ii) Is wealth much more unequally distributed than income?
(iii) Is the concentration of wealth at the top increasing over time? The main
conclusion of the paper is that the evidence about the UK concentration of
wealth post-2000 is seriously incomplete and significant investment in a variety
of sources is necessary if we are to provide satisfactory answers to the three
questions.
Policy points
 The evidence about the UK distribution of wealth post-2000 is seriously
incomplete.
 Significant investment in statistics is necessary if we are to be able to draw
firm conclusions about the extent of wealth concentration.
I. Wealth inequality under the spotlight
The distribution of personal wealth is now receiving a great deal of attention
– after having been neglected for many years. One reason is the growing
recognition that, in seeking explanations for rising income inequality, we need
to look not only at wages and earned income but also at income from capital.
Income from interest, from dividends and from rents represents a minority
of total personal income, but it is nonetheless a significant part, in particular,
at the top of the distribution. Moreover, viewed from the side of National
Accounts, the share of income from capital and rents has been increasing in
recent decades. In many OECD countries, the ratio of total personal wealth
to total personal income has been rising. One consequence is that the role of
inherited wealth – declining for much of the 20th century – has, in a number of
countries, begun to acquire greater significance.
The recent attention to the distribution of wealth has led to evidence being
sought on several key questions. The first is the extent of concentration of
wealth at the top. What is the share of total personal wealth that is owned by
the top 1 per cent, or by even smaller groups such as the top 0.1 per cent? The
second question is whether wealth is much more unequally distributed than
income. The OECD report, In It Together, stresses that ‘household wealth – in
particular financial assets – is much more unequally distributed than income’.1
The third key question is whether wealth inequality is increasing over time.
The OECD report says of the UK that ‘the financial crisis has exacerbated
the concentration of wealth at the top’.2 How far is wealth inequality
increasing?
1OECD, 2015, p. 34.
2OECD, 2015, p. 241.
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In this paper, we examine the evidence on these three questions for
the United Kingdom, focusing on the period from 2000 onwards. The first
prerequisite is to consider the range of sources of evidence about wealth-
holding. There has been disagreement in the UK literature about the level and
trend in the distribution of wealth, and this disagreement stems in part from the
use of different sources. Section II summarises the main ‘windows’ through
which we can observe the distribution of wealth in the UK, drawing attention to
their strengths andweaknesses. The second prerequisite is to clarify definitions.
There is no such thing as ‘the’ distribution ofwealth.Afigure for the share of the
top 1 per cent could relate to the top 1 per cent of households, or of families, or
of individuals. The share could relate to wealth excluding or including pension
rights; the pension rights could include state pensions or be limited to private
pensions. The 1 per cent could be limited to residents or could include those
non-domiciled. Section III of the paper sets out some of the key definitional
issues. Having cleared the ground, we examine in Section IV the light that
existing evidence casts on the answers to the three key questions posed in
the previous paragraph. This examination leads us to identify important ways
in which there needs to be investment in improving the informational base
about wealth-holding in the UK. The main conclusions are summarised in
Section V.
II. Different windows on wealth
There are four main potential sources of evidence about the distribution of
personal wealth in the UK:
 administrative (tax) data on estates at death, which indirectly provide
evidence about the wealth of the living, by applying (the inverse of)
mortality multipliers differentiated by age, sex and wealth class;
 administrative (tax) data on investment income, which indirectly provide
evidence about the wealth of the living, by applying yield multipliers;
 household surveys of personal wealth, such as the Wealth and Assets
Survey (WAS) conducted by the Office for National Statistics (ONS);
 lists of large wealth-holders, such as the Sunday Times ‘Rich List’, which
has been compiled by Philip Beresford in the UK, and the Forbes List of
Billionaires.3
There are in addition synthetic estimates that draw on two or more sources,
such as those of Credit Suisse Research Institute (2014), which combines
household survey data from the WAS with the number of Forbes billionaires,
3There exists a fifth potential source of evidence about the distribution of personal wealth: administrative
data on the wealth of the living derived from personal wealth taxes. However, in the UK there is no annual
wealth tax, and the council tax cannot be used for this purpose.
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and Vermeulen (2015), who combines extreme observations on the number of
billionaires as well as their wealth from the Forbes List with the WAS data.
In all cases, the evidence about the distribution of wealth has to be considered
in relation to the external control totals for population, based on demographic
data, and for total personal wealth.
Each of the sources is considered below, where we summarise the methods
and their main strengths and weaknesses.
1. The multiplied estate data
Estimates of the distribution of wealth based on administrative data from
the taxation of the estates of those dying in a particular year are reached by
applying the estate multiplier method. Estimates of the estate distribution are
first obtained from a sample of the estates submitting an inheritance tax return.4
Subsequently, the method considers the grossed-up population of decedents
as a sample of the living population. The death rate, however, is clearly not
random, as it varies substantially across age, gender, and social or wealth class,
etc. One can nonetheless define death as ‘random’ within each specific age,
gender, marital status, social or wealth class cell, and take each cell-specific
mortality rate as the ‘sampling rate’. Their inverse (‘estate multiplier’) can
then be used to re-weight the observations for decedents in order to obtain the
distribution for the living population. Additional adjustments have to be made
in order to control for individuals not covered by the estate tax statistics and
total assets not represented in the estate data.
These data on estates at death have long been used for economic research
in the UK. Initially, they were employed to make estimates of total personal
wealth. Baxter (1869) estimated the total wealth on the basis of the Probate
Duty data, applying a multiplier of 30, which he took to be the cycle for each
devolution of property. In terms of the distribution, such a single multiplier,
referred to as a ‘unitymultiplier’, means that thismethod yields estimates of the
distribution of estates, not of wealth. It takes no account of the differential rates
of death by wealth class. Following the proposal of Coghlan (in the discussion
of Harris and Lake (1906)), Mallet (1908) applied to each estate a multiplier
related to age at death. These ‘general mortality multipliers’ were subsequently
refined in Mallet and Strutt (1915) to apply ‘social class multipliers’ allowing
for the lower mortality of the upper and middle classes. Differentiation was
also made later on the basis of gender. For many years, this has formed
4Namely, the estates gaining a grant of representation (known as confirmation of executors in Scotland,
and probate or letter of administration in the rest of the UK). The estates held by younger individuals are
oversampled, while 100 per cent of the largest estates are included. With this procedure, estates of low value
are generally excluded, as well as those held in trusts or in joint names passing to a surviving spouse or civil
partner. The excluded estates accounted for approximately 70 per cent of total estates in 2008–10.
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the basis for estate-based estimates of the distribution of wealth in the
UK.
Applying multipliers yields estimates of the number of individuals owning
wealth in particular ranges and the amounts of their wealth. The next step is
to relate the numbers and amounts to external control totals. In the latter case,
the totals come from elements in the national balance sheets. This method
was developed in Atkinson and Harrison (1978) and by the Inland Revenue
in its (revised) Series C introduced to cover the period from 1976. Series C
was published on an annual basis until 2005. A new methodology has since
been introduced by HM Revenue & Customs (which has replaced the Inland
Revenue), with estimates being produced for three-year averages 2001–03,
2005–07 and 2008–10.5 The details of the change are discussed further in
Section IV.1.
The estate-based estimates have evident shortcomings. The first, and most
obvious, is that the estate data as such do not cover the rights to occupational or
state pensions.6 The second, equally obvious, is that the degree of concentration
of wealth is likely to be understated on account of tax avoidance and evasion.
Estate planning is certainly an effective way to reduce tax liabilities at death.
In the UK, for instance, assets given away at least seven years before death
are not subject to estate taxation. In statistical terms, this problem is mitigated
by the fact that the recipients are also subject to the risk of dying, and their
multiplied-up wealth appears in the estimated wealth distribution. However,
the donors are likely to be unrepresentative of their class (being less healthy)
so that the mitigation is only partial.7 A second source of avoidance is provided
by trusts (mainly discretionary trusts). Although the official Series C attempted
to make allowance for excluded wealth in trusts, these adjustments were based
on limited and increasingly dated information.
Moreover, the validity of the estate multiplier method depends on the
estate multipliers. The HMRC wealth model approximates the mortality risk
of wealthy individuals with that of individuals who are owner-occupiers taken
from the ONS Longitudinal Study of social class and occupational mobility.
This model was recently updated using the English Longitudinal Study of
Ageing (ELSA) to better capture the relationship between housing wealth
and mortality.8 Similarly, Kopczuk and Saez (2004) use the mortality of
US college-educated individuals as a proxy for that of wealthy individuals.
5Available from the HMRC website at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120403124426/
http:/www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal_wealth/archive.htm (Series C) and https://www.gov.uk/
government/collections/distribution-of-personal-wealth-statistics (new series).
6Although, for many years, the Inland Revenue made estimates of the distribution of wealth including
occupational pension rights (Series D) or both occupational and state pension rights (Series E) – see, for
example, Inland Revenue Statistics 1996, tables 13.6 and 13.7.
7See Atkinson and Harrison (1978, pp. 32–3).
8This represents an improvement on the ground that homeownership can hardly identify wealth in a
context of high and increasing homeownership rates. However, as acknowledged by HMRC, the data still
C© 2016 The Authors. Fiscal Studies published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd. on behalf of Institute for Fiscal Studies
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However, Saez and Zucman (2014) report that this may not be a good
approximation of mortality for wealthier people (above the 90th percentile
of the wealth distribution), whose mortality rate is considerably lower. They
argue that this mortality gap has been increasing over time in the US,
biasing downward the evolution of the estate-based wealth shares. The estate
multiplier approach would clearly benefit from a fresh systematic investigation
of mortality risk within the population according to social classes and income
and wealth levels.
2. The multiplied investment income data
The investment income method has been applied to the UK by Atkinson and
Harrison (1974 and 1978, ch. 7), building on the work of Barna (1945) and
Stark (1972). The underlying method has been described by Saez and Zucman
(2014, p. 1) in their recent paper on the US as follows:
Starting with the capital income reported by individuals to the Internal Revenue
Service—which is broken down into many categories: dividends, interest, rents, profits,
mortgage payments, etc.—for each asset class we compute a capitalization factor that
maps the total flow of tax income to the total amount of wealth recorded in the Flow
of Funds. We then combine individual incomes and aggregate capitalization factors
by assuming that within a given asset class the capitalization factor is the same for
everybody. For example, if the ratio of Flow of Funds fixed income claims to tax
reported interest income is 50, then $50,000 in fixed income claims is attributed to an
individual reporting $1,000 in interest.
They use the income tax data and the national balance sheets (Flow of Funds).
This may be contrasted with the ‘hybrid’ investment income method used by
Atkinson and Harrison, where the yields are taken from external sources and
weighted using asset composition data from the estate-based wealth estimates,
leading to a single capitalisation factor applied to total investment income
reported in the Survey of Personal Incomes (SPI), based on income tax returns.
The adoption of this hybrid approach reflected the fact that the income data
in the UK were only tabulated according to broad categories.9 It is also the
case that, where the estate-based asset composition data include assets that do
not generate income taxable under the income tax, these can be allowed for in
calculating the overall multiplier. Such assets include owner-occupied houses,
non-interest-bearing bank accounts, non-taxable fixed-income claims, durable
goods and collectibles. In contrast, Saez and Zucman make allowance for such
assets making use of additional data sources: surveys, property tax records,
etc; and they are also able to attach estimates of funded pension wealth.
present some problems to the extent that ELSA is designed to be representative of older households living
in England only.
9See Atkinson and Harrison (1978, p. 175).
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The theoretical basis for the investment income method and the potential
bias in the estimation of wealth inequality are set out in Atkinson and Harrison
(1978, ch. 7 and appendix VII), where two main sources of error are identified:
the variation with the level of wealth of the rates of return to individual asset
types, and the variation in the rate of return for a given asset and wealth
level (idiosyncratic returns). The US estimates of Saez and Zucman (2014)
represent an advance in that they employ data from foundations to demonstrate
that returns are flat within asset classes (the overall yield rises with wealth on
account of asset composition). In the case of the second source of error, the
authors argue from an illustrative calculation that ‘idiosyncratic returns cannot
create much bias’ (p. 16). The discussion in Atkinson and Harrison (1978) is
more cautious, concluding that the upward bias in the measurement of wealth
inequality ‘is large enough to be taken seriously but not sufficient to discredit
the investment income method’ (p. 199).
The investment income method has considerable advantages in that the
underlying data relate to the living population and the method does not
depend on assumptions about the differential mortality rates by wealth classes.
Estimates employing the hybrid investment income method were made by
Atkinson and Harrison (1978) for 1968–69 and 1972–73. Today, however, it
does not seem possible to satisfactorily apply the method using the currently
available data. The SPI micro data available to public users only provide four
variables (aggregating many different types of capital incomes): (i) dividends;
(ii) income from property; (iii) net interest from UK banks, building societies
and other deposit takers; and (iv) other investment income. In order to apply the
full investment income method, a more detailed version of the SPI micro data
would be necessary. The information contained in the internal SPI looks more
promising, but at the moment of writing we have not yet obtained effective
access to the micro data.10
The application of the hybrid method, as in Atkinson and Harrison (1978),
could be contemplated, but this requires a detailed breakdown of wealth
by asset types and wealth ranges. The published information for years
2000 onwards11 only gives six categories of assets and two of liabilities.
Again, to apply the investment income method, more detailed information is
required.
In our view, the investment income method should certainly be explored
further, but for this it is necessary that the underlying data be available in a
more detailed form.
10This explains why, at this stage, we do not provide results based on the investment income method in
Section IV.
11Table 13.1 on the HMRC website at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120403124426/http:
/www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal_wealth/archive.htm.
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3. Household surveys
Household surveys are a quite different source of data, unaffected by problems
of tax avoidance and tax evasion because unrelated to the operation of the
tax system, and able to furnish information about pension entitlements. These
surveys date back in the UK to the Oxford Savings Surveys in the 1950s.12
In the 1970s, the Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and
Wealth investigated the possible role of sample surveys of wealth-holding,
commissioning two small pilot surveys, but concluded that the results, ‘notably
the particularly low response rate (around 50 per cent)’, did not justify the
launching of a full-scale survey.13
More recently, attitudes towards household surveys have changed. The
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) began collecting data on financial
wealth in 1995. In 2000, the Office for National Statistics began to plan the
longitudinal Wealth and Assets Survey (WAS), which was launched in 2006,
funded by a consortium which also included (in 2012) the Department for
Work and Pensions, HMRC, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Scottish
Government.14 The first WAS spanned the period 2006–08, and subsequent
waves have covered 2008–10 (Wave 2), 2010–12 (Wave 3) and 2012–14
(Wave 4, full results not yet published), covering only Great Britain.
Does the renewed interest in household survey data on wealth reflect a
resolution of the problem of low response rates? This does not appear to be the
case. Wave 1 of WAS in 2006–08 achieved a response rate of 54.6 per cent
– similar to that found in the 1970s. Since the WAS is a longitudinal survey,
the calculation of the combined response rate over successive waves is not
straightforward, as the ONS attempts to re-contact previous wave non-contacts
and movers (household splitting) between waves. Figure 1 shows the absolute
number of households eligible at each stage and the number cooperating.
Waves 2 and 3 achieved higher response rates among those eligible, but this
still left a final total of only 15,517 households, compared with an initial
eligible sample of 55,835 inWave 1. Wave 3 included a new ‘booster’ sample,
with a response rate of 50.8 per cent.
A low rate of response does not necessarily imply that the results on wealth
shares are biased. On the other hand, there are a priori reasons to expect
there to be differential non-response by wealth classes. The feasibility studies
in the 1970s found that ‘the indications were that non-response would be
higher among those groups with higher incomes and substantial investment
income’.15 In order to mitigate this effect, the WAS made use of information
available from the income tax records to flag addresses where at least one
12See Atkinson and Harrison (1978, appendix I).
13Royal Commission on the Distribution of Income and Wealth, 1979, p. 117.
14Office for National Statistics, 2012.
15Office for National Statistics, 2009, p. 2.
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FIGURE 1
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Source: Data provided by Office for National Statistics.
person was likely to have total financial wealth above a certain threshold,
and these flagged addresses had a higher (two-and-a-half or three times)
chance of selection.16 However, the evidence gathered in Vermeulen (2015)
suggests that the oversampling strategy has not been very effective. There
were also problems of incomplete response. In the case of business assets, ‘a
high percentage of those who said they held business assets failed to provide
an estimate of the value of such assets’.17 This led to business assets being
excluded from the estimates of total wealth. This omission is likely to be
particularly important in the upper wealth ranges.
The issues of non-response and under-reporting at the top mean, in our
view, that the Wealth and Assets Survey – valuable as it is in covering the
majority of the population – cannot, on its own, provide a fully satisfactory
representation of the upper tail of the UK wealth distribution.
4. The Rich Lists
Since 1989, the Sunday Times has published annually in April a ‘Rich List’
of the wealthiest people or families in Great Britain. The lists, compiled by
Philip Beresford, appear as a supplement to the newspaper, and on occasion in
extended book form.18 The methods used in constructing the lists are set out in
‘Rules of engagement’.19 The description emphasises that the estimates are ‘the
16Office for National Statistics, 2009, p. 119.
17Office for National Statistics, 2009, p. 5.
18Beresford, 1990, 1991 and 2006.
19For example, page 91 of the Sunday Times Magazine, 18 May 2014.
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minimumwealth . . . the actual size of their fortunes may be much larger’. The
construction of the list draws on a wide range of public information, coming
from a variety of sources. The estimates relate to identifiable wealth, such as
land, property, art, or significant shares in publicly-quoted companies, and in
recent years have paid particular attention to liabilities (for example, where
shares are used as collateral for loans).
UK topwealth-holders are also included in the global Forbes List of (Dollar)
Billionaires, published annually by the business magazine since 1987. The list
is compiled by reporters who ‘meet with the list candidates and their handlers
and interview employees, rivals, attorneys and securities analysts. . . . We
do attempt to vet these numbers with all billionaires. Some cooperate, others
don’t’.20 Nonetheless, it is not easy to validate the information.
In summary, the Rich Lists provide valuable insight into the upper tail of
the wealth distribution, but it is not easy to assess their representativeness.
5. Total personal wealth
The shares of top wealth-holders depend on the control total for personal
wealth. In the early part of the periodwithwhichwe are concerned here, HMRC
provided a reconciliation of the wealth totals that is of central importance in
understanding the estimates of wealth shares.21 This is particularly useful to
control for the individuals as well as the total assets not represented within the
estate data (‘excluded wealth’).
The reconciliation begins with the total net wealth identified in the
multiplied-up estate data (‘identified wealth’), which was £3,432 billion in
2005, as shown in the online appendix. The first stage involves adjustment for
under-recording and differences in valuation in the estate data (for example,
replacing the maturity value of a life assurance policy by its equity value). This
increases the total in 2005 to £4,097 billion. To this is added the estimated
value of the so-called ‘excluded wealth’ – namely, that wealth not subject to
estate taxation as well as the wealth of those not covered by the estate data.
The so-called ‘excluded wealth’ includes estimates of joint properties, small
properties and trusts. The resulting total is £5,005 billion in 2005, and this is
defined as ‘Series C marketable wealth’. The total is 46 per cent higher than
‘identified wealth’.
The Series C total marketable wealth may be compared with the total
sector (S.14 and S.15 combined) wealth in the National Accounts balance
sheets. There are significant definitional differences. The first is that the
National Accounts combine households with non-profit institutions serving
20Dolan, 2012.
21Table 13.4 on the HMRC website at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120403124426/http:
/www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal_wealth/archive.htm.
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households (NPISH); the second is that the National Accounts balance sheets
are defined on an end-of-year basis. The most important difference, however,
is the inclusion in the National Accounts total of the value of funded pension
rights (£1,213 billion in 2005). The aggregate value of all pension rights, funded
and unfunded, occupational and state, is given as £2,999 billion in 2005.
It is evident that the adjustments to the estate data, and whether or not
pension wealth is included, make a significant difference to the control totals
employed.
III. Inequality of what among whom?
The paper is concerned with the distribution of personal wealth, by which we
mean the value of the total assets owned (directly or indirectly) by individuals,
net of their debts. Assets include financial assets, such as bank accounts,
stocks or bonds, and real assets, such as houses, business assets and consumer
durables. As defined here, it does not include ‘human capital’ (the capitalised
value of future earnings).
The implementation of this concept does, however, raise a number of
definitional issues, and these are resolved in different ways in different sources
of evidence.
1. Geographical scope
First, there is the geographical scope. The estimates discussed here relate either
to the United Kingdom (tax-based estimates) or to Great Britain (the WAS
household survey), the latter excluding Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland
accounts for 2.8 per cent of the UK total resident population. However, the
Sunday Times Rich List has a different approach. It includes people who
live and work in Britain, and people who are married to Britons, who have
strong links with Britain, who have estates and other assets there, or who have
backed British political parties, British institutions and British charities. It
includes British citizens abroad. The population represented is therefore more
extensive than that in the estate-based estimates, or investment income data,
or the WAS household surveys.
2. Unit of analysis
The unit of analysis in the case of the estate-based estimates and the investment-
income-based estimates is the individual.22 Estates are naturally recorded on
22This may clearly vary across countries depending on the nature of the tax unit. In the US, for instance,
a tax unit is similar to a family unit as it contains singles or married couples with or without dependants.
Therefore the estimates of topwealth shares for theUSbySaez andZucman (2014) based on the capitalisation
method relate to tax units and not to individuals.
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the death of an individual. Since 1990, the income tax has been levied on
an individual basis, and hence the investment income data take this form. In
contrast, the WAS survey data relate to the total wealth of the household,
defined as a person or a group of people (family members and non-relatives)
living together in the same dwelling.23 In the case of the Rich Lists, the unit
may be more extensive than the household. For example, in the 2014 Sunday
Times list, the top entry was the Hinduja brothers; third was Lakshmi Mittal
and family, which includes his son and daughter; the wealth of number 11
includes that of Galen Weston, his wife and his nephew, George Weston.
There are often multiple generations, such as number 19 (Earl Cadogan and
his son, Viscount Chelsea).
What difference does the unit of analysis make to the estimated wealth
shares? How can we compare the estate-based estimates of individual wealth
with the household wealth estimates in the WAS? If we treat all units as
weighted equally (so no account is taken of household size), then the control
total for households is smaller than that for individuals (by a factor 1/h, less
than 1, where h is the average number of adults per household). In 2010 in
the UK, the value of h is close to 2, and we take that value in the illustrative
examples below. The impact of moving from an individual to a household
basis depends on the joint distribution of wealth. Suppose first that in the top 1
per cent of individuals each person is married to someone with equal wealth.
They then constitute the top 1 per cent of households (since h = 2) and have
the same share of total wealth. On the other hand, to the extent that the top 1
per cent marry out of that group, the household-based share of total wealth is
reduced. Similarly, if the top 1 per cent of individuals are all single, then they
account for 2 per cent of total households, and the share of the top 1 per cent is
reduced, compared with that measured on an individual basis. The calculations
in Atkinson and Harrison (1978, p. 248) suggest that, in the limiting cases of
all single or of rich married to poor, the share of the top 1 per cent could be
reduced by 4 to 5 percentage points when moving from the individual to the
household distribution. In practice, the household-based estimates are likely to
be lower but by less than this amount.
3. Method of valuation
A third set of definitional issues concerns the method of valuation, a topic
that is often taken for granted. As the ONS says of national balance sheets,24
the wealth figures are taken to represent the ‘market value of the financial
and non-financial assets’, but the application of the market value approach
23Notwithstanding this, the WAS aims to follow individuals rather than households. In the case that a
household splits, with individuals living at different addresses, WAS interviews all of the original sample
members in the next wave of the survey (Office for National Statistics, 2014).
24http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/cap-stock/the-national-balance-sheet/2014-estimates/index.html.
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raises a number of issues. Life assurance policies provide an illustration. This
asset changes value on death: the maturity value recorded in the estate exceeds
the value to the person alive. For this reason, HMRC in its Series C made
adjustments. But the market value, in terms of what the policy would fetch if
surrendered, falls short of the continuing value to the person. Atkinson and
Harrison (1978, p. 5) distinguish between ‘realisation’ and ‘going concern’
valuations. Interpreted as what a person could realise by the sale of all assets,
net of liabilities, the former coincides in principle – with exceptions such
as life policies – with the value placed on an estate at death. The going-
concern valuation, however, could well be considerably higher. That there
can be a significant difference may be seen from the example of household
contents (durables, furniture, etc.), where the price obtained on sale is likely
to fall considerably short of the value to a continuing household (or the
replacement cost). A less common, but important, example of differences
between realisation and going-concern valuations is that of family businesses.
Finally, there is the case of pension rights, where the realisation value may
be zero, but they are of considerable value to a living person. The standard
approach to handling these differences is by the exclusion or inclusion of
classes of assets. The current HMRC estate-based estimates exclude pension
rights (private and state). TheWAS estimates both include and exclude pension
rights. The WAS estimates also exclude business assets. However, it seems
preferable to adopt explicitly either a realisation or a going-concern basis.
IV. Wealth shares in the UK since 2000
We discuss in turn the different sources of evidence about the distribution
of wealth in the UK and the conclusions that can be drawn about the three
questions posed at the start of the paper. As noted above, no results are given
using the investment income method, since we do not yet have access to the
necessary data.
1. Estate-data-based estimates
We begin with HMRC Series C, which covers the years from 2000 to 2005
(excluding 2004). The shares of the top 10 per cent, 5 per cent and 1 per cent
are shown in Figures 2 and 3 and Table 1. The published data also include the
share of the top 50 per cent, top 25 per cent and top 2 per cent; they do not
break down the top 1 per cent.
Series C ended in 2005. HM Revenue & Customs (2012) explains the
main changes in methodology in the new estimates, replacing Series C. The
most important are the move to producing estimates based on data averaged
over three years, the most recent being 2008–10, in order to reduce sampling
variation, and the adoption of new multipliers based on the variation of
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FIGURE 2
Estimates of the top 10 per cent wealth shares since 2000
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FIGURE 3
Estimates of the top 1 per cent wealth shares since 2000
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mortality with housing wealth.25 On the other hand, HMRC has dropped the
adjustments made in Series C for the excluded wealth, for valuation and to
a balance-sheet basis, focusing exclusively on the identified wealth. The link
with the National Accounts balance sheets has been broken, making very
difficult the estimation of the total personal wealth for these years. HMRC’s
reasons for dropping these adjustments are described as follows:
These adjustments were not based on robust data, and used operational adjustments or
assumptions instead. We do not know how accurate these adjustments are or if they
should be changing over time. The data on Adjusted and Marketable Wealth is sensitive
to these assumptions and so it was decided that this data was not robust enough for us
to continue to publish it.26
These concerns are understandable. For example, the Board of Inland Revenue
(2000) describes how the estimate of excluded wealth in trusts was based on
studies for two years (1976 and 1988) which were by then distant in time.
Although small in total, the addition would be largely allocated to the upper
wealth groups. A significant investment would no doubt have been required to
bring the estimate up to date. It is, however, regrettable that such an investment,
and investments in other elements, were not given priority and that, as a result,
the estimates of the wealth distribution are now less complete.
The ‘new HMRC estimates’27 show the numbers and total wealth of
individuals by ranges of net unadjusted wealth. In particular, the estimated
wealth is not corrected for potential under-reporting and undervaluation as was
done for Series C data. The same data are also presented in the form of decile
shares, but these are of little interest since they relate only to those identified
as wealth-holders (in 2008–10, only 31 per cent of the total population aged
18 and over) and only to identified wealth. In order to render the estimates
closer to those for earlier years, we have made two adjustments. First, we
have expressed the numbers as a percentage of the total population aged 18
and over. Second, we have taken as the control total for wealth the sum of
identified wealth plus excluded wealth as estimated by HMRC,28 where this
25The next update, covering the period 2011–13, was scheduled for publication in September 2015.
However, as we write, HMRC is proposing not to publish this or any further updates, the reason being
that it ‘[does] not think that the HMRC Personal Wealth National Statistics, which are based on data from
Inheritance Tax returns for estates requiring probate, can be reliably used to look at the distribution of
wealth amongst all people in the UK’ (HM Revenue & Customs, 2015, p. 4). There are indeed limitations
to the estate-based estimates, as we have noted above and as has been extensively discussed in the literature
over more than a century (a literature to which the Inland Revenue, the predecessor of HMRC, has been a
major contributor). But, as we have emphasised, other sources of data on wealth-holding have significant
limitations regarding the coverage of top wealth-holders.
26HM Revenue & Customs, 2012, p. 17.
27Table 13.1 on the HMRC website at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachm
ent_data/file/447352/table_13-1.pdf.
28Table 13.4 on the HMRC website at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20120403124426/
http:/www.hmrc.gov.uk/stats/personal_wealth/archive.htm.
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includes an estimate of the wealth of the excluded population. This procedure
is applied up to 2005, the last year for which the HMRC reconciliation exercise
has been published, and for subsequent years is extrapolated in line with total
personal wealth as estimated in the UK balance sheet.29 The results are the
estimates ‘derived from HMRC new series’ shown in Table 1.
Comparing the estimates in Figures 2 and 3 for the overlapping period
2001–03 (with data points for the new ones plotted at 2002), we can see that
the new HMRC estimates are, as we would expect, lower than the earlier
Series C estimates. The share of the top 1 per cent is 3.1 percentage points
lower. It should be noted that there is a considerable margin of error around
our estimated control total. Series C, indeed, cannot be directly compared
to the new assembled series from HMRC due to the lack of adjustments for
wealth valuations.
What do the estate-based estimates tell us about the three questions with
which we began? First, they indicate that the distribution of wealth in the UK
is highly concentrated. The top 1 per cent own between one-fifth and one-
quarter of total personal wealth. For instance, adding 3.1 percentage points to
the estimate for 2008–10 gives a figure roughly comparable to those for Series
C of 23.5 per cent for the share of the top 1 per cent.
Second, if we take the estimates in Table 1, then the share of the top 1 per
cent in total net worth (of individuals) is around double the share of the top
1 per cent (again, of individuals) in total net income (income after deducting
income tax), which in the first half of the 2000s was around 10 per cent.30 The
share of the top 10 per cent in total wealth was at that time about 50 per cent
higher than the share of the top 10 per cent in total net income. Of course, the
top x per cent of wealth-holders are not necessarily the same people as the top
x per cent of income-recipients.
Third, there is some indication that the top shares in wealth were increasing
between 2001–03 and 2008–10, but this may depend on the estimation of the
wealth control total, which is now subject to higher uncertainty as explained
above. We would therefore be cautious about drawing any firm conclusion in
view of the need for a more robustly established control total for wealth.
2. Household-survey-based estimates
The introduction of the Wealth and Assets Survey provides a new and
independent source of evidence about the distribution of wealth in Great
Britain. Figures 2 and 3 show the estimated shares of the top 10 and 1 per cent
29Blue Book 2014, S1HN-LE-B90: total net worth of households and NPISH.
30The shares of the top 10, top 5 and top 1 per cent of net income are provided in the online appendix.
The numbers are different from those appearing in the World Top Incomes Database (WTID) simply due to
the different definition of the population control total: adults aged 18 and over in this paper (for consistency
with the wealth distribution estimates), and adults aged 15 and over in the WTID.
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as supplied to the OECD by the ONS for the three periods covered (in each
case shown at the mid-point year – for example, 2007 for 2006–08). These
shares relate to household wealth (each household weighted as 1), and are
shown including and excluding pension rights (the latter data for 2010–12 are
included in the OECD Wealth Distribution Database, labelled 2012).
The first finding is that, in the case of the overlapping period 2008–10, the
WAS estimates excluding pension wealth suggest a share of the top 10 or top
1 per cent that is considerably below the estate-based estimates: 43 per cent
for the top 10 per cent, compared with 54 per cent, and 14 per cent for the top
1 per cent, compared with 20 per cent. We have to take account of the fact that
these estimates are household-based and that the geographic coverage differs,
but the difference is larger than could be explained in this way. Moreover, if
pension wealth is included, then the gap is even wider. The share of the top
1 per cent is only 11 per cent, or virtually half that found in the estate-based
estimates. If the share of the top 1 per cent were as low as 11 per cent, then
we would have to revisit the conclusion that wealth is much more unequally
distributed than income: the share of the top 1 per cent in after-tax income in
2009–10 averaged 10.7 per cent.
These estimates for Great Britain are compared by theOECDwith estimates
for other countries based on sample surveys. It is interesting to begin with an
earlier such comparison: that between Great Britain and the United States
based on household surveys in the 1950s.31 This found that the distribution of
wealth was significantly more unequal in Britain. Sixty years later, the OECD
figures show that the reverse is the case: the share of the top 1 per cent in the
US in 2010 is 36.6 per cent, or more than double the UK figure for 2009.32 This
dramatic change warrants further investigation, as does the fact that the top 1
per cent wealth share in Great Britain is so much lower (even leaving aside
pensions) than in Austria and the Netherlands (both 24 per cent) and Germany
(25 per cent).
The second finding is that the WAS-based estimates supplied by the ONS
to the OECD show a distinct upward trend. The share of the top 1 per cent in
2010–12 is 2.7 percentage points higher than that in 2006–08, when measured
including pension wealth, and the increase is nearly double (5.3 percentage
points) for the estimates excluding pension wealth. Such a striking conclusion
also needs to be investigated further.
3. Combined with the Rich Lists
The OECD (2015) refers to the problems with studying the upper tail of the
wealth distribution using household surveys: ‘measuring wealth at the top
31Lydall and Lansing, 1959.
32Cowell (2013, p. 44) draws attention to the ‘surprising’ finding from the earlier BHPS survey in 2000
that the UK exhibits less wealth inequality than the US, Canada and Sweden.
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of the wealth distribution through household surveys is intrinsically difficult,
as wealthy households typically under-report their wealth [and] household
surveys suffer from varying degrees of non-response [– the] bias is particularly
large when looking at the top 1 per cent of the distribution’ (p. 251). This has
led to attempts to use independent data fromRich Lists to ‘complete’ the survey
data. Vermeulen (2015) has combined extreme wealth observations from the
Forbes List ofWorldBillionaireswith theWASdata for 2008–10.He begins by
noting ‘there is a substantial gap between the highest ranked survey household
and the lowest ranked Forbes individual’ (p. 18). Fitting a Pareto upper tail, he
finds that the share of the top 1 per cent rises by between 1 and 5 percentage
points, depending on the threshold assumed for the Pareto distribution.33 The
higher end of this range would go some way towards closing the gap between
the household survey estimates and those for individual wealth-holding based
on the estate data for 2008–10. At the same time, we should note that those
identified in the Forbes List may include people who are not UK residents.
A Pareto extrapolation had been used earlier by Davies and Shorrocks in
the estimates they have prepared for Credit Suisse.34 In effect, they use the
total number of billionaires (but not their wealth) reported in the Forbes List to
fit a Pareto distribution. It is the changing number of billionaires that drives the
year-to-year changes shown in Figures 2 and 3 (the dashed series), since the
distribution is otherwise based on the WAS 2006–08. As may be seen, these
estimates suggest that the share of the top 1 per cent is close to the estate-based
estimates, and the share has increased by some 3 percentage points over the
period from 2000 to 2014.
The Rich Lists provide information on the shape of the upper tail of
the wealth distribution that allows for a more detailed investigation of the
distribution within the top 1 per cent. To date, official estimates of wealth
concentration have not shown shares for groups smaller than the top 1 per
cent (the same limitation applied to the findings in Atkinson and Harrison
(1978)). The Sunday Times Rich List for 2010 headline has 1,000 people with
£335.5 billion. These make up 0.004 per cent of total (GB) households and
5.3 per cent of total WAS non-pension wealth.
V. Conclusions
In this paper, we have used evidence from existing data sources to attempt to
answer the three questions set out at the beginning and to identify the need for
further information. The UKwealth distribution is indeed highly concentrated.
33See also Cowell (2013) on fitting a Pareto distribution to household survey data – in this case, data
from the Luxembourg Wealth Study.
34See, for example, Credit Suisse Research Institute (2014, p. 9), which describes the way in which their
method has changed over time.
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The estate-based estimates (the former HMRC Series C, the unadjusted
estimates and the new HMRC estimates, allowing for the understatement of
concentration) suggest that the share of the top 1 per cent is between a fifth
and a quarter of total personal wealth. The household survey data cannot be
used on their own to investigate concentration at the top. When combined
with information about the upper tail, the survey-based estimates (excluding
pension wealth) are below the estate-based estimates of top shares, but we
have to allow for the fact that the estimates relate to households rather than
individuals. On the basis of the estate-based estimates, wealth inequality at the
top exceeds inequality in after-tax income: the share of the top 1 per cent in
total wealth is about double the share of the top 1 per cent in after-tax income.
Finally, the estimates provide some support for the view that wealth inequality
increased in the UK over the first decade of the present century, but we believe
that any definitive statement should await further investigation.
Indeed, the evidence about the UK distribution of wealth post-2000 is
seriously incomplete and the main conclusion of the paper is that significant
investment is necessary if we are to provide satisfactory answers to the three
questions. Moreover, given the limitations of each of the different sources, it is
important to make use of all available approaches. The estate-based estimates
remain, in our view, an essential element when studying top wealth-holdings
(andwe do not believe that theHMRCofficial estimates should be discontinued
as currently proposed), but there needs to be a renewed investigation of the
mortality multipliers, the necessary adjustments and the reconciliation with the
balance-sheet information. The investment income method should be explored
further, but for this it is necessary that the underlying data be available in a
more detailed form. The issues of non-response and under-reporting at the top
mean that the household surveys – valuable though they are in covering the
majority of the population – need to be supplemented when considering the
upper tail. Consideration needs to be given to the use of investment income data
for this purpose, in addition to the Rich Lists. These recommendations require
resources, but unless such work is undertaken we shall not be able to draw firm
conclusions about the extent of wealth concentration, how it compares with
that in other countries and whether it is increasing over time.
Supporting information
Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this
paper on the publisher’s website:
 Appendix
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